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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a model of the relationship between Core Competence and Competitive
Advantage. The model frames competence relative to both skill related and cognitive components.
These components are presented in dynamic terms as they reflect the influence of changes both in
the broad environment and in the learning processes within organizations in maintaining competitive
advantage. The model also includes the concept of the core product as an intermediate phase
between a skill and a competitive advantage in a market. The model's relationships and dynamics
are examined through a 50 year study of competence and competitive advantage in the
pharmaceutical industry.

INTRODUCTION
The competitive advantages which seem to endure through both good and bad
economic times are the most prized assets of the firms which possess them, and the most
frustrating challenges for competitors which do not. Frustration occurs primarily because the
keys to competitive success are often difficult to determine and imitate. They lie beneath the
product/market interface where firms typically compete. In particular, sustainable competitive
advantage arises from the distinctive core competencies developed within the firm. Periods
of economic recession and recovery highlight those firms whose strategies are built firmly on
inimitable core competencies and those which are not. Businesses with competitive
strategies grounded in core skills not only survive troubled times with less pain than their
competitors, but they emerge stronger still. Firms wishing to understand or emulate industry
leaders and leaders wanting to maintain their competitive position need to clearly understand
what the concept of a core competence is and how it relates to competitive advantages in the
market place.
Unfortunately, core competence is often perceived as a static concept. In defining a
core competence or in describing a competitor's competence at any point in time, a
description is often used which implies a stable condition or relationship. Competition and
the competitive environment, however, are dynamic. Therefore, firms which maintain their
competitive advantages over many business cycles must have dynamic, not static, core
competencies. In defining core competencies in this paper we always assume that
competition and the competitive environment are fluid. We infer from this that one of the
basic challenges of any general manager is the relentless pursuit of alignment between the
ever changing core competencies within the firm and the ever changing demands of the
external environment. If a manager is to accomplish this, then a clear understanding of the
changing relationship between those core competencies and competitive environment is
needed.
In this paper we provide a framework to examine the relationship between core
competence and competitive advantage using both conceptual models and real-world
examples. The conceptual models draw on both academic and practitioner literature. Our
primary intent is to capture the many elements which drive core competencies and which link
them to competitive advantages. Our real-world analysis then evaluates competition in the
pharmaceutical industry and assesses those factors which have historically led to success in
this industry. It examines and analyzes the role which core competencies have played in the
performance of both leader and follower firms and charts the effectiveness of nine firms in
maintaining market alignment over a 40 year period of change.
THE CONCEPT OF CORE COMPETENCE
We propose a definition of the concept which encompasses each of the critical
elements which create and sustain a core competence and which distinguishes core
competence from other, related concepts. First a formal definition:
Core competencies are firm-specific skills directed towards the attainment of the
highest possible levels of customer satisfaction vis-a-vis competitors. Core
competencies may be leveraged directly to satisfy existing customer needs or
indirectly to develop a range of core products or core services. Firms with core
competencies are more than just highly adept at executing core skill sets. In addition,
they have built appropriate cognitive traits which include:
a) recipes and organizational routines for approaching ill-structured problems,
b) shared value systems which direct action in unique situations, and
c) tacit understandings of the interactions of technology, organizational
dynamics and product markets.
Both the activity oriented and the cognitive aspects of a core competence are built up
cumulatively through learning and are constantly adapted towards applying a firm's
skills so as to achieve competitive advantage.
The model shown in Figure 1 shows more clearly how cognitive traits, action-oriented skill
sets and the competitive environment are involved. These relationships are more fully
discussed in the succeeding paragraphs.
Figure One Here
Core Competence and Competitive Advantage The first component of our definition is
critical. It addresses the relationships at the very top of Figure One. We believe that no skill,
no matter how refined, can be a core competence if it does not give a firm an advantage in
the marketplace by satisfying a customer need better than a competitor. Although the point
seems rather elementary, it is important both for avoiding a mis-allocation of resources to
activities which, although done well, do not lead to competitive advantage, and for avoiding
under-allocation of resources to those activities which, although not directly linked to the
market, could lead to competitive advantage.
It is also important here to underscore the distinction between core competencies and
competitive advantage. Core competencies are internal traits of a firm. They are skills and
understandings that are accumulated over time. Competitive advantage describes an edge
that firm has in external market competition. Core competencies usually underscore
competitive advantages, but they are not the same thing. ^ For example, customers may not
^ Competitive advantages resulting fronn pure luck are not based on core competencies, they have neither the traits of a
skill base nor replicability.
be concerned with, or even aware of, Honda's core skills in refining the internal combustion
engine as described by Prahalad and Hamel (1990). They are motivated to purchase a
Honda over a competitor's vehicle because of the perceived value which comes from a
reputation for overall reliability. The core skill in engine design underlies the ability of Honda
to more effectively compete for customers, but actually the outcomes of competition occur on
a different plane.
It is also important to note that our definition infers that a core competence must be
unique to the firm. Core competencies must lead to unique, distinctive traits such that
economic profit can be earned in otherwise open competition. It is based on this point that
core competencies are often called "distinctive competencies" (Andrews, 1980). Failure of the
competence to be distinctive will result in the equivalent of Porter's (1 980) "profitless
prosperity".
Core Competencies and Core Products and Services The model indicates that
competence may not lead directly to a competitive advantage. Here the idea of a core
product or service is introduced (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). This is located on the right side
of the figure and will be referred to only as "core product", although services clearly are major
applications of competence. A core product serves as an intermediary between the core
competence and a product in market competition. The core product is not the final product
consumed in the market, and may not even clearly identify the market in which competitive
advantage will be realized.
There is a sequence here, not unlike an activity chain, which ties the core
competence to competitive advantage through the core product. Core competencies are first
applied in core products and services, then other traits are wrapped around these core
products to create the final product or service which will advantageously compete in the
market. Hence, it is through the mechanism of core products that a single set of core
competencies can be dispersed to multiple product markets. In this respect core products
and services are the basis for successful diversification. In Prahalad and Hamel's example of
Honda they show how engine competencies allowed that firm to compete successfully in the
distinctive markets for automobiles, motorcycles, lawn mowers and electric generators. Here
it was clearly the ability to package the core product with other traits which led to successful
diversification into multiple markets wherein the core product could lead to competitive
advantage. By contrast, we can infer that Honda's core competencies would not lead to
competitive advantage in, say, ladies retail clothing; the core products which the core
competencies produce can not be advantageously packaged with other traits for competition
in that product market.
Core Competence as both Action and Cognition A firm's core competence exists on
two levels. On one level there is the active component of a core competence, the exploitation
of a skill which focuses on performing some activity better than the competition. For
example, actually designing increasingly more efficient internal combustion engines would be
a skill exploitation. Consistent with the internal orientation of core competence developed
thus far, we see such core skills are meaningful in competition, but need not be the basis of
product/market competition itself. Later we will note how this activity of "doing" (or exploiting)
not only leads to core products, but also is a key component of the iterative learning process
which improves competence levels over time.
The second level or component is the cognitive portion of the competence. Assuming
all actions/skills are driven by some mental model, map or recipe, this level captures these
cognitive factors which lie behind core skills and which can transform the mere doing of an
act into a competence. These may be cognitive traits shared by a group or they may be
found in the mind of the single individual. One implication is that it is through the effective,
ongoing development of these cognitive traits, that core skills rise to a level which is distinct
from those of a competitor, leading to core products and competitive advantage. These "soft"
traits of core competence are subdivided into three parts, all of which are interrelated with
each other, as indicated by the two-headed arrows in Figure 1 . Further, the roles of all three
are predicated on the basic assumption of a constantly changing competitive environment,
where change often occurs in non-linear and unpredictable, ways. Indeed, without the need
for firms to cope with such ongoing dynamics, the learning process, would not be necessary
and the concept of a core competence would revert only to the development and
maintenance of specific stable core skills.
The discussion of cognitive traits in the model begins with the proposition that
competition is a dynamic process. Mintzberg (1 978) makes the point that competitive
strategy "emerges" over time, in contrast to being a rationally executable fixed plan. This
inability to fully plan competitive strategy is predicated on the inability to fully understand
future events. Firms must, therefore, respond to events which were not fully foreseeable as
they emerge and incorporate those events into their competitive strategy. As strategies
emerge, "recipes or routines" (Nelson and Winter, 1982) play an important role in competence
enhancement. They embody the ways the firm organizes stimuli as they come from the
environment. These stimuli carry important information about the future effectiveness of a
core competence in providing competitive advantage, but because of the unpredictable
nature of emergent events, organizational routines have to be adaptable so as to incorporate
this information effectively. Therefore, in the dynamic process of maintaining core
competence, operating routines must exist for (efficiently and effectively) responding to
external events and integrating relevant changes into the set of core skills.
The cognitive traits of a core competence also include a shared value system (Ouchi,
1981 ; Peters & Waterman, 1982) among key decision makers. It is the shared vision of those
who hone the core organizational skills which gives the appearance of singular action to a
multi-person effort. For example, Intel has been described as a decentralized and ill-
structured organization. But its strong shared values system uses this as a strength, enabling
a large organization to respond smoothly, and quickly to the fast changing environment for
microprocessors (Hof, 1992). The shared understanding of what the core skills are and how
they relate to competitive advantage drives team efforts in sales forces, research labs and the
like. Such a shared vision allows for the common recognition of the external changes
affecting the core competence and the quick integration of change in an organizational recipe
and core activities.
The third cognitive aspect of core competence is a unique understanding of the
different aspects of competitive dynamics. The competitive advantages to which core
competencies lead is a function of several forces from both the supply and the demand side.
Environmental events directly and indirectly impact several of these factors simultaneously.
Responses to changes in the external environment must be formulated based on the totality
of the competitive situation. These actions require deep understandings of how the various
components of supply and demand relate to the core competence and the competitive
advantage it produces. For example, a change in the regulatory environment may
significantly effect a firm's ability to bring new products to market. But it also interacts with
the functions of the firm's research team and the application of its marketing skills, among
others. It is the combined impact of the change in technology with all of these other factors
which will determine the actual impact of the environmental change on the firm's competitive
posture. Therefore, maintaining core competencies requires an understanding of the
interaction of a change in one aspect of the environment with other aspects of the
organization. Kotter (1982) identifies such rich cognitive understandings as one of the traits
of effective top managers. Here the roles of shared values and established recipes and
routines facilitate the process.
Continuous Learning There is more to the dynamics of maintaining a core
competence than just responding to the environment. Organizations must learn. By learning
we refer to the acquisition of new and unique understandings through experimentation.
Competencies evolve through an iteration of doing, learning and doing some more. Each
sequence expands knowledge and enriches core competence. Clearly this process will occur
more often as organizations digest a change in their environment, but organizations which
nurture their core competencies tend to continue their internal learning processes even in the
absence of external motivation. Indeed, one of the shared values of organizations which have
maintained long-term competencies is the continuous refinement of their core skills. Senge
(1 992) states that this process of experimentation and improvement is the key to competitive
success. More specifically, Mintzberg and Waters (1 982) identified it as the process by which
Steinberg Inc. of Canada shifted from a traditional grocery to a self-service operator.
Similarly, the late Sam Walton describes his organization's two decades of experimental
learning about discount retailing prior to the explosive growth of the Wal-Mart chain (Walton,
1992). The dynamic environment, and the ability to experiment and improve, are seen here
as competitive opportunities for the competence leaders to be entrepreneurial~to stay ahead
of competitors, not just keep up. The flow of learning from the experimental doing phase to
8
the cognitive traits which make a shared sense out of the competitive market is a critical part
of our model in the context of a dynamic world.
The Total Model and a Caveat The firm's goal of earning economic profit inexorably
ties the demands of the competitive environment to the core competence of the firm. We
should re-emphasize the point that all of the activities which take place in the lower part of
the diagram (Figure 1 ) are still performed in the context of the larger product/market
relationship and the pursuit of competitive advantage. The concept of critical success factors
in an industry (Bullen & Rockart, 1 986) indicates that there are key areas which a firm must
address in order to compete at all in an industry. Indeed, a firm which wishes to earn
sustainable profits from competition must address at least one of these success factors better
than the competitors if there is to be a basis for earning an economic profit. In this respect
the market determines or limits what core competencies a competitor may have. Similarly,
firms which have developed competitive advantages in the market have predetermined for
themselves which core competencies must be maintained.
This is not to say that purely entrepreneurial activity does not take place. Indeed, the
examples of Steinberg and Wal-Mart mentioned above indicate that what is often considered
entrepreneurial behavior actually involves the development of a new set of core skills which
became critical to success in the next stage of industry competition.
Just as no one entrepreneur can create demand for non existent needs, so too, no
firm, no matter how skilled, can respond to major competence destroying shifts in the
environment (Tushman and Anderson, 1987). What we are saying here is that the very
processes set up to handle change and manage core competencies assume some
underlying basic structure of demand, and of how that demand is satisfied by the supply side.
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If that relationship is fundamentally altered, then such a quantum change destroys any
competitive advantages that firms once enjoyed. The underlying competencies are often
rendered useless. The speed and scope of such environmental change presents a situation
which is more than just evolutionary, it is revolutionary. For example, in the 1 950s many firms
had developed high skill levels in the manufacture and refinement of the vacuum tube.
Environmental monitoring kept labs on the edge of new knowledge in vacuum tube
technology. As the technology evolved, what was needed to maintain competitive advantage
evolved, too, consistent with our model. Experimenting and learning helped leading firms
push their underlying competencies outward and kept them ahead of competitors. Still, when
the transistor was developed none of these evolutionary systems could save the vacuum tube
market. Like buggy whips and butter churns before them, they maintained their skills but lost
their competitive advantage. No competitive advantage can exist if no demand exists; all the
skills and competencies built up will produce neither sales nor economic profits. We
therefore have to limit the scope of the model to exclude the case of a dynamic environment
which undergoes competence destroying change. ^
RESEARCH QUESTIONS DRAWN FROM THE MODEL
The model just described presents some assumptions about the relationships between
core competencies and the market. They lead to three more formal research questions
discussed below.
However the learning portion of the model may provide a basis for understanding the evolution of newly emerging
markets and develop insights into how new skill sets may lead to the development of firm-level core competencies.
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Research Question #1 The model presented here distinguishes between a core
competence and a product/market relationship. We have said that core competencies and
core products must address the most basic questions of any business if they are to lead to a
competitive advantage: the who, what and how of customer needs (Abell, 1980). When the
competence enables a product of service to satisfy some fundamental point of customer
need better than the competition it will yield economic profits for the firm. The more desirable
and profitable core competencies build up a broad base from which numerous businesses or
products can emerge. However, if the competence or skill does not yield a product or
service which fits with the competitive environment it will be unprofitable. We suggest that
how and where core competence translates into a competitive advantage will be determined
by how the customers and other environmental factors define the product/market relationship.
This leads to the first research question:
Research Question #1 Is the determination of which competencies
are "core" and lead to competitive advantage made by the
competitive environment or the firm?
If in fact the competitive environment provides the basis on which competencies can
be built, then an industry analysis should allow for a clear identification of the core
competencies on which industry members will compete. Stated another way, we should not
expect to find any firms in an industry competing on a base competence which is not
predetermined by the competitive environment.
Research Question #2 In the discussion of how core competencies related to
competitive advantage we required that the competence be firm-specific. We are assuming
that competencies, no matter how skillfully developed and executed, will not provide
competitive advantage if they are held by more than one competitor. Those, core
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competencies which will lead to a competitive advantage can not be quickly acquired or
purchased in an open market by a competitor. Although they could possibly be acquired
through purchase from the sole owner, perhaps through acquisition, this does not eliminate
the unique status of competitive advantage to whom ever holds it. Thus, firms should not be
able to lose competitive advantage due to quick copying by a competitor of their underlying
competence. Instead, competence should have the potential to provide a firm with a long-
term source of economic profit. Only significant environmental change, a competitor's
development of alternative skills or failure to maintain one's own competence should underlie
a loss of competitive advantage. For studying the ability to maintain a core competence the
second research question looks at the exceptions for insights about sustainability.
Research Question #2 How do firms with established core
competencies lose competitive advantage over time?
In the analysis of an industry over a sufficient period of time changes in industry
leadership should be observable. In examining the long-term changes in the competitive
positions of firms an industry analysis can research overall trends in the industry environment
and in the competitive positions of individual firms. By comparing the environmental shifts to
the competencies in individual firms it can be determined whether changes in the critical
success factors in the environment led to shifts in organizational performance. If not, an
analysis at the firm-level can be made to see if failure to maintain core competence was
responsible for the performance shift. It is anticipated that these alternative explanations of
the relationship between core competence and the environment may throw light upon a given
firm's loss of competitive advantage.
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Research Question # 3 A key concept in our model is the role of organizational
learning. In the model competencies are based on developing firm-specific knowledge and
skills. The firm-specific nature of the knowledge enables the firm to stake out a unique
competitive position. The development of firm-specific knowledge, therefore, requires more
than just collecting information and commonly known skills from the environment. Firm-
specific learning must take place. Failure to learn and grow is critical because of the
changing nature of the external environment and the demands of the customer. Thus, one of
our key points is that learning is a two pronged process when related to core competencies.
First, a firm must constantly be collecting information from experimentation and from the
external environment. Second, the firm must refine this information internally~it must develop
it to a level beyond that of competitors such that the firm retains its edge even as the
competitive demands of the industry change. If is this second type of learning which Senge
(1 992) sees as critical to maintaining competitive advantage and we agree.
Research Question #3 What role do learning processes play in
maintaining core competence in a dynamic environment.
Here the focus in the analysis will again be on those firms which have lost their
competitive edge. In identifying how they lost their edge questions can be raised as to the
role of learning in this loss. Here the interaction between the scope of the change, discussed
in question 2, and the speed with which the firm can learn new skills can be examined.
CORE COMPETENCIES AND THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
Selection of Industn/ and Firms for Analysis The pharmaceutical industry provides an
excellent industry to use in studying the applicability of our model. First of all, this industry
has been extensively studied by both academics and regulators. These discussions have
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lead to a strong consensus about the core competencies in the industry. Second, a broad
base for differentiation among therapeutic classes of drugs provides numerous opportunities
for competence building and hence situations in which to observe dominant firms rising and
falling over the industry's history. Finally, the industry is made up of corporations which are
generally dominated by their pharmaceutical units. This allows the researcher to get a clear
view of business-level competition largely unencumbered by other corporate business units.
The modern pharmaceutical industry is generally dated from the end of the Second
World War. There were, however, many firms conducting drug research prior to the war and
some significant products had been developed (Sneader, 1985). These operations, however,
were often greatly over shadowed by the larger chemical and dyestuff operations of many
firms, particularly in Europe. In the US almost no new ethical drug research was undertaken
in the pre-War era. The war saw the shift of penicillin research from Oxford, England to
Peoria, Illinois. There, a consortium of US firms developed the deep-tank fermentation
techniques which allowed for the mass production of penicillin. Armed with competencies in
soil screening for antibiotic action (and the fact that several European competitors were
reduced to ruins) these firms went into pharmaceutical research. The granting of patents by
the US patent office for artificial antibiotics in 1 948 guaranteed profitable returns from
pharmaceutical research. Together these events created firms whose dominant business was
the pursuit of ethical drugs, independent of overriding chemical or dyestuff operations.
An overall sample of 41 firms was examined used in this study (see Table 1). These
were the largest firms in the US and Western Europe. In a prior study we have looked at how
the relative competitive postures of these firms changed in the US market between 1 969-1 988
(Bogner and Thomas, 1991). The nine firms which make up the primary focus of our
discussion are presented in Table 3 together with a brief description of their competitive skills.
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We have focused primarily on these firms, although the competencies of other firms are also
discussed.
Core Competencies in the Pharmaceutical Industry Core competencies have
traditionally been based on the skills involved in R&D, marketing and promotion. Our
research shows however that these broad descriptions are much too general. Core R&D
skills have to be interpreted relative to the various therapeutic classes of drugs which exist.
These classes not only recognize the different pockets of demand for drugs they also
recognize different bases of R&D skills. For example, the skills needed to develop antibiotic
drugs are different from those which produce psychotropic drugs. More over these
therapeutic classes have shifted in their relative importance in the overall drug market over
the years. In the 1 940s and 1 950s antibiotics were the primary new drugs. In the 1 960s a
wave of psychotropic drugs provided significant advances in dealing with mental and
emotional problems. And in the 1 980s a new generation of cardiovascular drugs replaced
older therapies.
A second observation with respect to R&D skills addresses the changing character of
the research methodology required to identify new drug compounds. Prior to the Second
World War skills in molecular manipulation and mass-assay testing drawn from the organic
chemistry of the dye trades dominated R&D. These skills retained their dominance until quite
recently. The soil screening and fermentation skills of the antibiotic firms in the 1950s
provided an alternative research base for some firms, primarily from the US. Later a major
shift change from large-scale trial-and-error techniques occurred when developments in the
life sciences of biology and chemistry advanced to the point where researchers could
develop drugs based on knowledge of how the body's systems operated. This "rational drug
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design" allowed for more concentrated research. The increased knowledge of biology,
however, eventually led to a more radical change in the 1 980s with the emergence of
biotechnology as an alternative to organic chemistry as the base for drug research. A
summary of the changes in R&D and other areas of competence is provided in Table Four.
Similar patterns of competence changes occurred over time in the area of marketing
and promotion. Prior to the 1 950s direct selling to physicians did not exist. However, the
creation of "prescription-only" drugs in the US prior to the Second World War, along with the
increased flow of new synthetic antibiotics, brought about the need to develop skills for
influencing the physician. The physician occupies a unique position as a gatekeeper who in
fact purchases the drug for the patient with little regard to price. Through the decades since
that time, firms have built detailing sales forces directed at the physicians which fit into the
medical cultures of the various countries in which they sell. However, at least two major shifts
have occurred in that dominant selling pattern over the last 1 5 years as indicated in Table
Four. These new competitive postures created new bases for the development of selling
competencies. Similarly they rendered older ways of selling ineffective.
Finally, our review indicated a new and growing source of competence: the ability to
effectively cope with regulatory agencies. Again this was not always a source of competitive
advantage. Only in 1 962 did the US establish pre-market approval requirements. During the
1 960s most Western countries established similar administrative procedures for new drug
approval. The next two decades saw these procedures become more and more onerous.
Particularly in the US, large sums of money and, more importantly, over half of the product's
patent life, are now sacrificed in order to comply with drug approval processes. It is clear,
however, that significant variation exists in the amount of time different firms spend in the
approval process. Firms aim to be "first-to-market" so as to establish drug-of-choice status
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and build up switching costs with respect to subsequent entrants. Therefore, effectiveness
(and speed) in dealing with regulatory agencies may lead to significant long-term competitive
advantages within therapeutic classes.
FIRM ANALYSIS
Nine firms which reflect the range of competitive positions in the industry were
selected for intensive case study treatment. In particular, the case studies sought evidence
on relationships between core competence and competitive advantage. Based on the case-
study observations made here, conclusions about the research questions will be drawn.
Sales figures for the nine firms are presented in Table Five. These data include only
pharmaceutical drugs. Please note that the descriptions given in the following section use
the universal chemical names of specific drugs. The brand name used in the US is often
given in parentheses and is capitalized.
Merck Merck is the largest seller of pharmaceutical drugs in the world. This a
position which Merck has held for the better part of a decade now, but they did not occupy
that position during the middle years of this industry's brief history. It was, however, the
technological base which Merck brought into the industry at the outset which would be the
key to their latter success.
Merck was a "fine chemical" producer prior to World War Two. As such Merck did not
sell proprietary remedies, rather they sold chemicals and chemical compounds to
"professionals": doctors, researchers and pharmacists. Merck participated in antibiotic
research during the war and emerged with streptomycin, an important early drug. Merck,
however, gave the patent to Rutgers University and allowed it to be freely licensed (Temin,
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1980). As a result Merck seems to have missed being a major player in antibiotics (which
dominated the industry for twenty years). Merck did however stick to its skills in organic
chemistry. In much the same way as Hoechst formulated new compounds prior to the war,
Merck employed tedious trial and error tests on organic compounds and produced a series
of non-antibiotic drugs which sustained the firm through the antibiotic era.
When rational drug design created the opportunities for firms with broad chemical
backgrounds to exploit their skills more advantageously Merck's management seized the
opportunity. Building on established bases in cardiovascular drugs and rebuilding its
antibiotic skills, Merck was able to introduce a string a drugs in these and other areas in the
1980s. Merck's labs have always been seen as their strength (Byrne, 1987). As Merck has
grown larger, management of a creative laboratory environment has become more difficult.
The questions which are raised about the ability of the firm to maintain its leadership now
center on how management handles the dynamics in the lab (Meyer, 1990).
Merck has realigned its sales force in the 1 980s to reflect the move toward more
targeted selling. Merck's sales force is the largest in numbers in the US and carries a
reputation as being the best trained as well. Training includes extensive continuing education
for established sales personnel. The sales function is championed at Merck, with all potential
executives spending some of their early months with the firm promoting drugs to doctors.
Merck is also extremely adapt at dealing with government regulators. While new
biotechnology firms have had some well publicized difficulties in gaining new drug approvals,
Merck's products move through quickly, retaining more of their patent life.
Glaxo Glaxo is in many ways the antithesis of Merck, although Glaxo is number two
in world market-share. Glaxo is essentially a one drug company, namely ranitidine (Zantac).
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While the company has other products and a promising pipeline in some areas, their global
rank has been achieved primarily through ranitidine and their great competence in marketing
it. In the 1970s Glaxo was perceived as a weak firm; Boots even attempted to take them
over. They had no unique products and no presence in the two largest markets, the US and
Japan. In the late 1970s, however, they had formulated a slightly different version of the
emerging super-drug cimetidine (Tagamet) produced by Smith Kline & French, now
SmithKline Beecham. Glaxo's version was not considered superior on any important trait for
the vast majority of users and other second movers were entering the market too. Further,
SK&F had established cimetidine as the most successful drug ever, with sales approaching
$1 billion annually in the early 1980s.
However, Glaxo developed a strategy for selling ranitidine in Italy. Using what they
learned there about focussed selling they set their sights on the US. Without a large US
sales force, Glaxo "rented" the under-utilized sales force of Hoffmann-LaRoche and put all of
its resources into promoting a single drug. The results were stunning. Ranitidine, not
cimetidine, became the first billion dollar drug and Glaxo has maintained its sales and profit
growth ever since. Since the success of Glaxo's launch of ranitidine other large firms have
redesigned their sales functions to mimic Glaxo's techniques. Primarily they have sought to
reduce the number of products which each salesperson handles and to target their
salespeople more narrowly, based on physician characteristics. This results from the belief
that the promotion of a few "blockbusters" produces more profit than a large more diverse
product line. Consequently much larger sales forces are now being used in the industry.
Whether Glaxo has retained its core competence in blockbuster marketing remains to
be seen. Glaxo has not yet tried to launch its second super-drug. Although they clearly are
readying new attempts, Glaxo has only focused on developing a few blockbuster drugs. In
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1986 Glaxo had only 13 products in development compared to Merck's 89 (Economist, 1986).
Glaxo has no non-ethical drug businesses and they have sold their ethical operations which
do not produce high margin products, ie. bulk antibiotic manufacturing plants.
Bristol-Mvers Squibb These two firms merged in 1 989 with the intent of matching the
scope in both products and research which is found in firms such as Merck and Ciba-Geigy.
Bristol was an antibiotic firm through the 1 960s. In 1 969 they sought to diversify their
research. Their more successful efforts were in cancer drugs and central nervous system
drugs. However, by the late 1 980s their total breadth of new products did not match that of
the largest firms. In 1 988 Bristol ranked twelfth in the world with Rx sales of just over $2
billion. A similar story characterizes the recent evolution of Squibb. Squibb also was a major
antibiotic firm through the 1 960s. In the 1 970s they sought to branch out of antibiotics and
were primarily successful in the cardiology market. However, they too were unable to keep
up with leaders such as Merck and were 1 4th in the world in 1 988 with Rx sales of about $1 .7
billion.
In the strategic group study of the competitive positions of Squibb and Bristol Myers
through the 1 970s and 1 980s (Bogner and Thomas, 1 992) both of these firms were facing a
permanent future in a second-tier position in the US market (see Exhibit Two). They had
strong R&D skills, but not in all of the major drug classes. They were also being pressed by
the changes in marketing to build the extensive focused sales forces needed to target drugs
to specific physician groups. The merger of these two firms allowed them to address both of
these weaknesses. The R&D strengths complemented themselves well. Not only did the new
firm have competencies within classes, they had skills across classes which could take
advantage of technological opportunities whenever they occurred in the market. The
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combination of sales forces allowed for more product and physician specialization.
Competencies, however, are built over time and the merger requires that organizational
competencies and managerial skills develop in parallel. We have noted that what makes a
competence distinctive is the inability of firms to quickly build or buy what is needed to match
another's strength. In becoming third in the world in sales Bristol-Myers Squibb has merely
combined products already out of the research pipeline with established reputations among
physicians. The competitive question for the 1 990s for Bristol-Myers Squibb is whether they
have the ability to come close to Merck in the underlying competencies of developing and
promoting wholly new drugs and in fully integrating the core skill-sets across two diverse
organizations.
Hoechst Hoechst is a broad based chemical firm with about 1 8% of its sales in
pharmaceuticals. The firm has a very strong base in organic chemistry research which dates
back to the 1 9th century. Hoechst has survived the two wars of this century and continues to
provide important products. Until recently a lack of an extensive marketing operation in the
US required licensing there of all but a few products. Hoechst has attempted to build up its
pharmaceutical business through sales force additions around the world during the 1 980s.
Hoechst provides a strong example of the endurance of firmly established
competencies. Following the destruction of the Second World War Hoechst was able to
return to drug research and develop some key products, including furosemide (Lasix) and
tolbutamide (Orinase, licensed to Upjohn). The competence resided in the minds and the
methods of Hoechst researchers, not in the bricks and mortar. Allied bombers destroyed
assets which were not the basis of Hoechst's competence. Thus, the firm was able to
rebound as a leading innovator as soon as capital could rebuild factories. Clearly the capital
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and other limitations prevented the firm from taking full advantage of its research
competencies, as the license of tolbutamide to Upjohn indicates. However, as long as the
research competence is retained, the firm will continue to have a competitive advantage with
their new products. Therein lies the challenge for a firm such as Hoechst. As research shifts
more toward a biology base and away from organic chemistry, the core skills (and
competencies) or Hoechst must change in a relatively dramatic manner as well.
Eli Lilly This firm provides a strong contrast to the Bristol-Myers Squibb strategy
described above. Lilly has a very similar history to those other two anti-biotic firms. Indeed,
Lilly was even more centrally focused on antibiotics than Bristol or Squibb. They also
prospered in the 1 950s and 1 960s, only to have a performance shortfall in the late 60s and
early 1970s. Like the other two, Lilly was engaged in a research diversification program. That
began in the late 1 970s, but seems to have been more successful. The firm notes that six of
its top-ten products were antibiotics in 1 980, but by 1 990 its top ten products covered 7
different therapeutic classes. Lilly has long had some bifurcation of its sales force to avoid
duplication in the heavily covered antibiotic areas. In the 1 980s Lilly added a third wing to its
sales force to more finely target hospitals. Lilly led the world in hospital setting drugs through
the 1980s and it wants to maintain its position even as it grows elsewhere.
The larger number of product areas and the desire to lead hospital sales while
expanding retail presence may lead to difficulties in competence maintenance for Lilly. We
have presented competencies as dynamic, almost living, parts of the organization which have
to be nurtured at a level where the competence remains distinctive. As Lilly expands the
number of therapeutic classes in which it seeks competitive advantage it takes an ever
increasing flow of resources to keep up with, and exceed, the performance of firms such as
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Merck, Bristol-Myers and Hoechst in each class. The size of the cash flow available to
sustain a competitive position becomes significant here. With pharmaceutical sales trailing
the industry leaders by between $1 .5 and $2.5 billion annually, Lilly has significantly less
resources to dedicate to achieving a competitive edge across multiple research classes.
Hoffmann-LaRoche Our analysis of Hoffmann-LaRoche (Roche) indicates a firm with
good basic competencies in organic chemistry, but with a limited product focus. Many
aspects of Roche are quite secretive. The firm is still family controlled and Swiss law requires
minimal disclosure. Observation of the firm's sales performance and the scope of their new
drug introductions, however, cannot be hidden. In that respect Roche reflects the slippage of
a firm whose competence focus could not maintain its competitive advantage over time.
Roche's success in the 1 960s and early 1 970s led to the presumed position of #1 in the
industry. Even without financial disclosure it is clear that their psychotropic drugs dominated
that therapeutic class of drugs. The development of the benzodiazepine class for Roche,
however, was, in part, serendipitous (Sneader, 1985). The resulting drugs, chlordiazepoxide
(Librium), diazepam (Valium) and flurazepam (Dalmane) all became large selling drugs. In the
1970s these drugs came under severe price pressure from government purchasers,
particularly in the UK. In the 1 980s rapid patent expiration brought in a range of generic
manufacturers and aggressive price competition, driven by the very product successes that
had made Roche so profitable. If Roche had nurtured a core competence in psychotropic
drug development, then a new line of patent protected drugs would have replaced the older
products as the drugs-of-choice. But, Roche had only a limited product range with which to
replace their ageing lines. (The under utilization of their US sales force was a key element in
23
Glaxo's launch of ranitidine in the US.) The firm has slipped greatly in the global market
share tables.
In this case competition was dramatic as patents expired around the globe on Roche's
key drugs. Competence is based on the idea of replication. By maintaining competencies
firms continue to maintain competitive advantage in the wake of Schumpeterian creative
destruction. Roche, however, was unable to replicate the success of the benzodiazepines, in
spite of the hugh cash flows and large leads in research insights which the firm possessed. It
was not that there was an insurmountable technological barrier. Bristol-Myers, Lilly and
Upjohn were all able to bring out new, patent-protected drugs in the 1 980s which were very
successful in this drug class (known in the US as Buspar, Prozac and Zanax respectively).
Unable to match its prior success through internal development, Roche has sought to acquire
a base competence in the new biotechnology by acquiring 60% of the leading biotechnology
firm in the US, Genentech, in 1990, and then acquiring a key diagnostics technology from
another biotechnology firm, Cetus, in 1991. Roche's ability to nurture competence is even
more a challenge than that of Lilly. Lilly is seeking increased levels cash flow generation to
keep their skill levels competitive with those of the top firms. Roche is attempting the more
difficult task of re-framing and re-developing a set of new core skills for their R&D thrusts, at a
level better than the existing competition.
Schering-Plough Schering-Plough is one of three smaller firms which this study will
highlight. This firm should not be confused with the Germany firm, Schering AG, from whose
assets the US based firm was formed after the Second World War. In the 1 960s and 1 970s
the firm was very dependent on one product, gentamicin sulfate (Garamycin), for its profits.
Foreseeing its inability to compete against larger antibiotic firms Schering-Plough appears to
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have sought out a niche position, focussing its limited research dollars on the once promising
substance, interferon. The firm acquired a large stake ($8 million in 1979) in Biogen,
consistent with this focus on a leading edge biotechnology. The interferon technology,
however, did not pan out with the result that Schering-Plough produced the worst return to
investors of any Fortune 500 firm from 1975-1984 (Steyer, 1985). In the late 1980s the
interferon market was estimated at about $50 million. In the 1990s Schering-Plough
continued this focus, expanding its interferon research and production in Ireland and
elsewhere.
Burrouqhs-Wellcome (Wellcome Foundation) Burroughs Wellcome (BW) has a history
of making significant contributions to drug research which dates back to the late 19th
century. However, that research legacy has not translated in to competitive advantage until
recently. Similar to Schering-Plough, BW was a firm of limited scope and presence in the
global pharmaceutical market in the 1 970s. They too had decided on a focus strategy.
Unlike Schering-Plough's movement to the cutting edge of research, BW returned to a much
researched area which had been largely abandoned by other firms, namely, anti-virals. Anti-
viral research was considered to be a research "black-hole" by many firms. In 1 982 BW
introduced acyclovir (Zovirax) to help control the symptoms of herpes, then the scourge of
sexually transmitted diseases. Herpes was quickly overshadowed by AIDS and BW had the
response for that virus too, bringing out azidothymidine (AZT) in 1 986, a modification of an
earlier disappointing cancer drug.
While BW has had other new products as well (most notably they fought with
Genentech over tPA, the anti-clotting agent), anti-virals and their research has come to be a
dominate force. The sales of anti-virals have greatly aided the development of the firm's over-
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all size, but they still remain mid-sized. Here a new problem emerges in maintaining a
successful competence: too much success brings in aggressive new competition from larger,
established firms (Porter 1980). Indeed, the potential market for AIDS drugs has almost all
large firms engaging in significant levels of research. Most important, in doing this research
these firms are building their own firm-specific skills in the anti-viral area in general. With or
without success in the AIDS area, these firms will have a stronger base from which to do
more anti-viral research in the future. Where BW used to dominate the niche others avoided,
they now face a range of large firms pursuing the same competence-based advantage in a
mainstream area.
Marion Marion no longer exists as an independent company. In the 1 980s they were
regarded as one of the top firms in America by Forbes and Business Week. In 1 989 Marion
was acquired by Dow Chemical and its performance since has been disappointing at best.
The reality is that Marion achieved its accolades by being an innovative first-mover in outside
drug acquisition. They had no distinctive competencies which could not be easily copied by
larger competitors. In the late 1 970s Marion began licensing products to fill out its very
limited product line. Two drugs, known in the US as Cardizem and Carafate, were licensed
from Japanese firms, which had no skills in testing new drugs for approval in the US. Marion
took these products through testing and regulatory approval. They were introduced by
Marion in the US in 1 982 and 1 981 respectively. Both were tremendous successes,
accounting for over 70% of the firm's sales by 1987. The firm boasted of being a "search and
development" firm based on its searching for foreign firms' promising drugs and bringing
them to the US market. Needless to say this does not reflect a pipeline of internally
developed drugs.
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Marion's competence was not distinctive at all. It could be, and was, easily copied by
other firms. Moreover, many of the firms with whom Marion competed for new licenses were
larger, with more experience in gaining drug approval and with bigger sales forces for post-
approval promotion. This is not to say the firm had other competitive options. Even in its
very successful 1 988 fiscal year its total pharmaceutical sales were less than $750 million. In
a competitive environment of the 1 960s a smaller firm such as Marion could sun/ive on its
small product line. In the 1 990s, with high drug research budgets and the largest firms
aggressively competing in all important classes through R&D and promotion, a small firm is in
need of a very unique niche to service long-term competitive advantage. Put another way,
the resources required to build and sustain a core competence were beyond the reach of a
firm of Marion's size and considerably lessened its ability to remain within the industry's
mainstream.
ANALYSIS OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Research Question # 1 With every one of the nine firms discussed above it is clear
that the competencies they possess or they pursue are defined by their environment. Any
competitive advantage which a competence gives is determined not so much by the level of
skill as by the market's demand for that skill. This can be seen most dramatically by
comparing the two niche firms, Burroughs-Wellcome and Schering-Plough. The skills in anti-
virals and interferon respectively are both first-rate at these two firms. Yet BW has had
tremendous success while Schering-Plough has not, based on the scale of the market
demand for the products of these skills.
Breakthrough products should be viewed in much the same way. The skills which the
antibiotic firms developed during World War Two proved to be profitable because of the
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preexisting demand for a cure for infection. So too, the products which came form the
European based organic chemistry firms were based on skills which were pursued because
of market place demands for those skills in the first place. The sudden rise of the AIDS
epidemic and the subsequent surge in research is evidence of the extent to which
competencies are built as a reflection of market demands (ie. demand-pull).
Conversely, the proposition that the core competencies which will lead to competitive
advantage can be determined by the firm is rejected by the Marion case. Here a firm was
able to achieve some unquestioned successes. However, Marion was not able to make their
combination of seeking out foreign licenses and bringing drugs to the US market into a
competence. The market for these licenses did not define Marion's skill as distinctive vis-a-vis
its competition. As a result, the firm was unable to continually replicate the success they had
had with Cardizem and Carafate. This may or may not be the case with Glaxo. When Glaxo
developed the blockbuster approach to promotion they gained a short term advantage over
their rivals. Whether that advantage is distinctive or not in the long run remains to be seen.
Note that Glaxo seeks to outperform its rivals by limiting itself to a few big drugs and heavily
marketing them with a distinctive marketing and promotion mix. Whether this combination of
skills can lead to competitive advantage will only be determined over the next decade.
The concept of economic profit ties together the ideas of core competence and
competitive advantage. Competitive advantage is the sustainable base on which those profits
can be earned over long periods of time, and core skills must be built, accumulated and
maintained towards that end. The more successful firms studied here did exactly that. In the
case of Bristol-Myers Squibb the merger was driven by a desire for a mix of R&D skills across
the therapeutic classes deemed critical by the market. In the cases of Lilly and Merck this
same market-dictated goal was sought through internal development of core skills. And in all
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three cases the future success of their skill bases in maintaining their competitive positions
will be determined by the success of new drugs in the market-the extent to which their
particular research oriented skills give them products which command a competitive
advantage.
Research Question # 2 The analysis now moves to examine those firms which lost
their competitive status over time. We want to see what contribution distinctive competence
and its relationship to competitive advantage make to explaining why some firms lost top-
performance positions in the industry over the 50 years of the study.
The first group of firms we looked at is the antibiotic firms. In the 1950s these firms
emerged with competencies in a new technology which allowed them to produce products
with hugh demand. Were those products a source of competitive advantage? Here the
score is mixed. Some firms, particularly Lilly and Glaxo, were able to develop competencies
in developing cephalosporins, antibiotics which were used largely in hospitals, and to
continually develop new generations of products from the 1950s through the 1980s. Other
firms, however, were not so successful in distinguishing their products. Several firms,
including Bristol-Myers, had ended up in similar competitive positions with their research and
their products became close substitutes for each other. The resulting 'letracycline
conspiracy" represented the clearest evidence of the inability of these firms to distinguish their
products in the market (Costello, 1980). In that case the firms simply agreed not to challenge
each other's patents for tetracycline in exchange for promises not to license the drug beyond
a small group of manufacturers nor to compete on price. The tetracycline conspiracy
produced litigation which spanned two decades. These firms were unable to use their initial
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R&D skills to develop differentlatable new products and hence another base for competitive
advantage was needed.
With price competition eliminated, and with no technological advantages with which to
develop new products, the antibiotic pioneers shifted their competitive energies to promotion.
It was at this time, and with these products, that the firms began to build their advertising and
promotion competencies. Pfizer is largely credited with the first advertisements directed to
physicians. Others followed. Lederle spent the then unheard of sum of two million dollars to
conduct promotions for chlortetracycline (Aureomycin) in 1 948. In 1 952 their direct mail cost
alone was one million dollars for their tetracycline (Achromycin) (Measday, 1972). The firms
effectively moved the competition to marketing where there seemed to be greater
opportunities for competitive advantages to be built.
What caused these firms to lose their edge was not the increased price competition
which resulted from the end of the price fixing. What hurt the firms was the inability to
continue to develop new, distinctive, patent-protected drugs. A few firms such as Lilly and
Glaxo were able to move into second-generation cephalosporins, but the hospital market is
very competitive and in that market the firms were played off against each other by
purchasing agents and the use of formularies. Further, as products moved more and more
toward commodity status, the differentiating ability brought about by marketing skills became
less and less significant. When the use of generic substitutes in retail prescriptions was
eased in the US in the mid-1 970s, the resulting price competition hurt these firms even more.
It should be recalled that in our cases we saw that Bristol-Myers, Lilly and Squibb all began
more aggressive therapeutic class diversifications, moving their research programs away from
antibiotics at about this time. Fortunately, this was also the time that rational drug design
techniques began to take over in the laboratory, facilitating the move. Still, these programs
30
alone did not allow the antibiotic firms to recapture the lost prestige of the 1 950s and 1 960s.
Only through merger do Bristol-Myers Squibb hope to keep up with the pace in new research
set by Merck and Glaxo.
In the case of the antibiotic firms the initial technology only created a single base on
which distinctive competence could be built. When that base became overcrowded with
close substitutes the skill level of the participants had obtained in their research was
overwhelmed by the lack of distinction which those skills brought to the product-market. This
clearly illustrates one of our points about the dynamics of distinctive competencies: They
must be continually improved at a level which gives the firm a degree of differentiation
sufficient to command super-normal profits.
By contrast the Hoffmann-LaRoche case illustrates how a single firm can gain
distinctive products for a period of time, then fail to maintain a competence. A review of the
technological environment for psychotropic drugs clearly indicates that there was still room
for further advances beyond the drugs Roche introduced. Further, Roche did not lack
financial resources or effort in trying to maintain its competitive position in the drug class.
They simply lacked the core research skills to produce subsequent products needed to
replace the benzodiazepines. Meanwhile, other firms in this study, most notably Lilly, Bristol
and Upjohn, were able to produce new and very successful drugs in that therapeutic class.
These two situations, antibiotics and the benzodiazepines, provide interesting
examples of how competitive advantage can be lost. Many antibiotic firms had their
advantages in the therapeutic class shrink as more and more firms matched the leader with
similar drugs. No one firm could either significantly distinguish themselves from the
competition or push out the technological boundary through internal research. In Roche's
case competitors bypassed the leader with new drugs. History showed that in both situations
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there was still an opportunity to push out the technological horizon through new product
research. An advantage largely held by one firm was now aggressively sought by several
firms, each of which was able to make firm-specific advances in the technology which
produced drugs of significant demand. Indeed, it was noted that Merck was able to re-enter
antibiotics as a holder of major patent protected products in the late 1 980s, just as many of
the traditional antibiotic firms were diversifying away from that class of drugs. Thus, firms with
a competitive product at one point in time were constantly challenged to maintain that
advantage by rivals. Failure to learn and increase core skills ahead of rivals leads to a loss of
economic profits.
Clearly the technological barriers for maintaining a competitive advantage became
more difficult over time, but that is precisely why competitive advantages can be unique and
sustainable for the few firms which can effectively maintain them with internally protected skills
and knowledge. When the barriers were low in the early days of the antibiotics several firms
made similar advances in skills and competencies. As a result no advantage ensued, save
through conspiracy. In recent times the increased difficulty of vaulting the technological
barriers has allowed only the most highly skilled, those with true competencies, to launch
successful new products. (In this vein, the question can be asked about the extent of
Roche's skills in the first place-did luck play a larger than expected role in their initial
breakthrough? Regardless, the market shows that the true competencies which lead to
competitive advantage in this class of drugs resided elsewhere.) In both antibiotics and
psychotropics the analysis supports our proposition that competitive advantage which is not
based on replicable and growing distinctive skills will not be sustainable in the long run.
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Research Question # 3 The two prior discussions lead directly into an analysis of
learning in sustaining competence. Two things are clear about the changes in technology,
marketing and regulation discussed here. First, the environment in all three areas is
constantly changing. Second, not all firms pick up on these changes. A third point with
respect to the technological and marketing areas is also important: Internally developed skills
often drive the ability to better meet existing demands. Learning, particularly firm-specific
learning, is therefore critical for long term maintenance of competitive advantage. In the
technology area we saw how firms in major drug classes were able to succeed or fail based
on their ability to learn about that class of drugs and its underlying biology and chemistry.
Recall that we are using learning here in the sense of truly experimenting and discovering.
The firms which stayed in the lead (eg. Merck and Hoechst) were able to effectively pursue
this type of learning. They mixed the results of their experimentation with new public
information to maintain an overall level of knowledge which was inclusive and unique. Others
(eg. Roche) did not.
The importance of staying ahead in learning can also be seen in the smaller firms
examined. Burroughs-Wellcome was able to stay ahead on anti-virals for some time. But,
one can ask how much of that lead was attributed to distinctive tacit skills and how much was
due to lack of interest by the rest of the industry which considered the anti-virus area to be
unprofitable? Only time will tell if BW can continue to push out antiviral knowledge through
internal learning at a pace which allows it to maintain its lead in new product introductions.
Time did prove to be unfavorable in the case of Marion. Their first mover advantages were
quickly learned by others and there was no additional skill which Marion could add to
maintain their distinctiveness. In smaller markets where competition is less vigorous,
competitive advantage and economic profits may endure for some time. Yet in the light of
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strong competitors, a firm must lead in learning if it is to maintain its advantage in the market.
Our analysis strongly underscores the role of every firm's ability to learn as a critical factor in
maintaining long-term competitive advantage.
We can now return to an important distinction about keeping advantage in the light of
aggressive competition: Acquisition is not necessarily a form of or a substitute for learning.
The Bristol-Myers Squibb merger allowed these firms to combine their past successes. But
does this mean that the new firm, at double the size of either old firm, can continue to learn in
each of these therapeutic classes it now covers? Financial theory supports the proposition
that the firm must learn if the acquisition is to retain value. Buying one's way to the leading-
edge of technology should require a purchase price that reflects the present value of the
expected economic profits which will accrue from that leading-edge core skill. Thus, the
purchasers should not receive any economic gain from their acquisition unless they can push
the technological edge out further still through additional learning. In merger or acquisition,
dynamic learning requires the state of knowledge to change position, not just possession.
New or combined product areas create the need for learning to continue in areas or ways
where the firm was not positioned to learn before. Roche's recent acquisition of a controlling
interest in Genentech is the interesting case here. Roche clearly would like to push out
Genentech's leading-edge core skills, but whether its acquisition will include Genentech's
ability to learn beyond the skills already possessed is another issue. Roche possessed
leading-edge core skills in psychotropic drugs at one time too, but they were unable to
position that knowledge further out over time. Through learning other firms passed them in
the race for competitive advantage in the therapeutic class.
Similarly, acquisition must not be seen as a replacement for core products as the base
for growth into new markets from the existing core competence. Core products lead to new
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marketplace products because learning takes place in the organization through the building
of core products and team-based organizational skills. Over time the number of
product/market interfaces where competitive advantage exists may increases, even while the
number of core competencies which have to be nurtured by learning remain the same.
Hoffmann-LaRoche was able to develop two different tranquilizers and a sleeping pill, all of
which were major products, from its base discovery in the benzodiazepines.
Finally, we note that how well others can copy a firm's core skills clearly limits the
firm's ability to maintain competence. Glaxo was able to use a skill In launching ranitidine,
but has it been copied? Speed and efficiency in copying what others have learned once it
becomes public is the effective limit on the returns which internal learning can bring. Recently
some bio-technology start-ups have been unable to develop skills in dealing with regulators
and their products are slow to reach the market. But have enough firms effectively mastered
this skill so that it no longer represents a competitive advantage to a Merck or a Rizer, only a
weakness to those firms which do not have it? If internal learning is the key to maintaining
competitive edges and skills, then the external dispersion of these skills so they can be
learned by others is the way in which the resulting competitive advantage can be lost.
Strategic Groups and Competitive Advantage Throughout the discussion of the
pharmaceutical industry it is clear that the nature of the opportunity to which distinctive
competence is targeted changes from time to time. Dynamic strategic group studies reflect
these variations across an industry and over time (Cool and Schendel, 1987; Fiegenbaum
and Thomas, 1990). The larger study of competition in the pharmaceutical industry shows
that there are alternative bases on which competence were built at different points in an
industry's history. In general, the ability of firms within the same industry to choose
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alternative competitive postures is not new (Galbraitli, 1973, Miles and Snow, 1978). In
dynamic strategic group studies clusterings of firms are developed based on the patterns of
resource allocations of the member firms. As industries evolve, differing competitive
alternatives will appear and rivalry is anticipated to be most keen within each group of
similarly competing firms (Porter, 1980). Thus, core competence and competitive advantage
would seem to be most significant in intra-group competition.
The reason competitive rivalry builds up so intensely within each strong group is an
outcome of the on-going pursuit of competitive advantage through similar competence which
this paper describes. Because groups represent the alternative patterns of resource
allocations across an industry, each group contains firms which are attempting to build similar
competencies. These rivals invest in the development of core skills and tacit knowledge over
time. They develop resource bases or bundles which can not be easily changed and which
are dedicated to the pursuit of the strategic posture which the group represents. A firm which
has gained competitive advantage along the dimensions which define a certain viable
competitive position will out perform its rivals. The others, however, have difficulty
abandoning the trajectory which they have developed through prior resource allocation
decisions. To do so requires the building of alternative core skill bases from the ground up
and competing against entrenched competitors in other viable positions. Instead, followers
will try harder to win in the group which they currently are members, thereby increasing rivalry
and the incentive for usurping leaders over time.
Only wholly new opportunities, with no entrenched competitors, represent an easy
opportunity for change. The difficulty in shifting competitive groups can be illustrated in the
case of Lilly. When the antibiotic market opened in the 1 940s Lilly and several other firms
aggressively entered, looking for competitive advantage. Lilly was one of the few developing
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skills which sustained them at the top of this therapeutic class for decades. However, when
Lilly wanted to diversify out of their narrow base in antibiotics they had to enter drug classes
with established competitors. This transition took more than a decade for Lilly to make. The
incentive to win in the strategic group a firm is currently in increases the pressure on the
leader to learn and to stay ahead-the trailing rivals aren't going to just go away.
CONCLUSIONS
We conclude that competitive advantage must be based on distinctive core
competence if it is to be sustained over time. But such relationships are neither stable over
time or uniform at any one point in time. A core competence must continue to give
competitive advantage as the demands of the environment, and hence what constitutes a
competitive advantage, changes. Therefore, the skills which underlay the core products and
services of the firm must be constantly changing and improving over time.
This process of change and improvement in core skills involves decision makers who
need to employ their cognitive abilities to manage this on going change. Through an
interactive process of learning, firms alter their core competencies continuously in an attempt
to maintain competitive advantage in a changing environment. Our analysis of the
pharmaceutical industry shows that this is the key to successful tying of core competence to
competitive advantage in the long-term, but it is difficult. Few if any firms can continuously
maintain the lead position in this process over the long term. In our study we saw different
firms dominating the pharmaceutical industry with different skills at different times. Still, those
firms which consistently built on their core skills and aggressively pursued the competitive
advantages which their environment made available tended to be the most successful over
the long term.
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Table One
Firms in Data Base
Abbott Labs
American Home Products
American Hosp. Supply ^
C.Rc Bard '
Becton-Dickson ^
Bristol-Myers
ICN
Eli Lilly
Johnson & Johnson
Marion Labs
Merck
Norwich-Eaton (P&G)
Pfizer
Richardson-Vicks (P&G)
Merrell Dow
A.H. Robins
Rorer
Schering-Plough
G.D. Searle
SmithKline Beckman
Sterling
Sybron ^
Syntex
Upjohn
Warner-Lambert
Beecham*
Boots*
Glaxo*
ICI*
Burroughs-Wellcome*
Ciba-Geigy*
Hoffmann-LaRoche*
Sandoz*
Hoechst*
American Cyanamid
Squibb
Barr
'
Bolar
'
Mylan ^
Par'
Zenith '
* European firms studied here.
' Generic firms added to original list.
^ Hospital supply firms dropped from
the original list.
Table Two
Strateaic GrouDS in the U.S. Pharmaceutical Market
•1969
GrouD One GrouD Two Group Three Group Four
Beecham Abbott Labs American Home Products Pfizer
Bolar Bristol-Myers American Cyanamid
ICN Burroughs-Wellcome Hoffmann-LaRoche
Marion Labs Eli Lilly Imperial Chemical
Men-ell Johnson & Johnson Merck
Mylan Parke-Davis Searle (G.D.)
Norwich-Eaton Robins (A.H.) Smith Kline & French
Rorer Schering-Plough Syntex
Zenith Sterling
Squibb
Upjohn
1970-1977
GrouD One Group Two GrouD Three GrouD Four
Beecham Abbott Ciba-Geigy Barr
Boots American Cyanamid Hoechst Bolar
Bristol-Myers American Home Products Hoffmann-LaRoche Marion Labs
Burroughs-Wellcome Eli Lilly Imperial Chemical Merrell
ICN Squibb Merck Mylan
Johnson & Johnson Warner-Lambert Pfizer Norwich-Eaton
Robins (A.H.) Sandoz Par
Rorer Searle (G.D.) Zenith
Schering-Plough Smith Kline & French
Sterling
Syntex
1978-1980
GrouD One GrouD Two GrouD Three GrouD Four
Burroug hs-Wellcome American Home Products Ciba-Geigy Barr
Glaxo Beecham Hoechst Bolar
Johnson & Johnson Bristol-Myers Hoffmann-LaRoche Boots
Robins (A.H.) Eli Lilly Imperial Chemical ICN
Rorer Pfizer Merck Marion Labs
Schering-Plough Smith Kline & French Sandoz Men-ell
Searle (G.D.) Squibb Sterling Mylan
Syntex Warner-Lambert Upjohn Norwich-Eaton
Par
Zenith
GrouD Five
Abbott Labs
American Cyanamid
Table Two, continued
Strateaic Grouos in the U.S. Pharmaceutical Market
1981-1984
GrouD One Group Two GrouD Three Group Four
Boots American Home Products American Cyanamid Barr
ICN Bristol-Myers Beecham Bolar
Marion Labs Burroughs-Wellcome Ciba-Geigy Par
Merrell Glaxo Eli Lilly Zenith
Mylan Johnson & Johnson Hoechst
Norwich-Eaton Robins (A.H.) Hoffmann-LaRoche
Rorer Schering-Plough Imperial Chemical
Searle (G.O.) Merck
Smith Kline & French Pfizer
Syntex Sandoz
Warner-Lambert Squibb
Sterling
Upjohn
Group Five
Abbott Labs
1985-
GrouD One GrouD Two GrouD Three GrouD Four
Boots Burroughs-Wellcome American Cyanamid Barr
ICN Glaxo American Home Product Bolar
Marion Labs Johnson & Johnson Beecham Mylan
Merrell Dow Bristol-Myers Par
Norwich-Eaton Ciba-Geigy Zenith
Robins (A.H.) Eli Lilly
Rorer Hoechst
Sterling Hoffmann-LaRoche
Imperial Chemical
Merck
Pfizer
Sandoz
Schering-Plough
Searle (G.D.)
SmithKline Beckman
Squibb
Syntex
Upjohn
Warner-Lambert
Group Five
Abbott Labs
Merck
Table Three
Firm's/ Sample Analysis
Fine chemical firm, a few, key non-antibiotic products; jumped into rational
drug design to take R&D lead; responded to Glaxo with broader, deeper,
detailing; "knows" the FDA; #1 firm in the world.
Glaxo History of focused research (cephalosporins, Zanax, new migraine drug);
developed "blockbuster marketing" concept, first in Italy, then in the U.S.;
#2 firm in the world.
Bristol Myers-Squibb
Hoechst
Two firms with narrower product backgrounds merge to try to match Merck
in product scope and R&D focus-have they matched the competence? or
do they continue to lag? #3 firm in the world.
Largest corporation among top drug producers/ deep skill in organic
chemistry/ source of many pre-WWII breakthrough drugs/ marketing skills
still deficient outside of Western Europe/ #4 Rx firm in the world.
Eli Lilly Traditionally considered an antibiotic house/ major shift diversifies sales
and products over broader range of therapeutic classes/ marketing also
reorganized to fit different physician profiles/ #9 firm in the world.
Hoffmann-LaRoche Once the leading firm in the world/ narrow focus on psychotropic drugs
and related discovery/ acquisition of Genentech (60%) in 1989/ fallen to
11th in the world.
Schering-Plough
Burroughs-Wellcome
Medium sized firm, but much smaller than the largest ones here/ focused
on a major potential product line-interferon related cancer products/ failed
to pan out/ company struggles/ 15th in the world in 1988.
Medium sized firm as well/ focused on major potential product line-
antiviral products/ success with herpes and HIV treatments in the 1980s/
can this single competence support the firm?/ 23rd in the world in 1988.
Marion "Search and develop" strategy not distinctive/ no long-term "distinctive"
competence/ acquired by Dow in 1989/ 33rd in the world in 1988.
Table Four
Core Competencies in the Rx Industry
Competencies in R&D
Technology
Organic Chemistry
1870s-Present
Fermentation and
Soil Screening
1940s- Present
Rational Drug
Design
I970s-Present
Biotechnology
1980s-Present
Impact and Nature
Established by Central-European
dye firms through molecular
manipulation, trial & error
Established antibiotic firms in the
United States. Narrow
competence not transferable to
other drug classes.
High cost drug development
driven by advances in bio-
chemistry.
Non organic approach to drug
therapy.
Firms/Role
Hoechst, Ciba-Geigy: Sustained
competence in product
development for over a century.
Lilly, Squibb: Dominant products
brought industry leadership for
twenty years, then began to lag.
SmithKline, Merck: Able to
develop drugs, required cutting
edge research across classes.
Genentech, Amgen: Specialized,
cutting-edge research, knowledge
and insight.
Competencies in Marketing and Promotion
Skill
Direct Selling
to Physicians
1950s
"Blockbuster"
Marketing
Early-mid 1980s
Specialized
Selling
Impact and Nature
Allowed for the effective
marketing to gatekeepers in
economic transactions.
Single product focus of entire
detail force and promotion.
Effective with narrow product line.
Specialized Sales forces for
different therapeutic
classes/medical specialties.
More focus with broad product
line.
Firms/Roles
Pfizer, Lederle: Created effective
differentiation of products among
gatekeepers.
Glaxo: Created a new way to sell;
through selling, gave blockbuster
potential to a chemically
indifferent drug.
Merck: Specially trained and
focused units in cardio, hospital
etc.
Table Four, continued
Core Competencies in the Rx Industry
Competencies in R&D
Competencies in Marketing and Promotion
Handling regulatory Speeds drugs to market Merck, Marion: Of limited
requirements expanding time available value without competence
under patent for in acquiring new drugs
economic profits.
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